Ukrainian Decentralisation under Martial Law: A Balancing Act

Ukraine’s landmark decentralisation reform is often seen as one of the country’s most successful transformations. Launched after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, it shifted power and resources from central government to hromadas (local self-governing communities). The reform is credited with boosting regional development, strengthening democratic accountability, and creating a more resilient governance system. All this proved vital when Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. Yet under martial law, in force since 24 February 2022, local authorities have been operating within an uncharted emergency regime. Three and a half years later, this Spotlight examines how Ukraine’s decentralised system has adapted to the pressures of wartime governance and considers the implications of martial law for the country’s post-war reconstruction.

Martial law: a setback for decentralisation?

Martial law has profoundly reshaped Ukraine’s governance framework. New regulations granted wide-ranging discretionary powers to military authorities and introduced temporary mechanisms for coordinating the local and national crisis response. While these adjustments were necessary, they blurred traditional boundaries between civilian self-government and state security institutions. Military administrations were established in 14 per cent of all hromadas, mainly in frontline and de-occupied regions in the east, where they assumed competences typically reserved for elected local councils. They were also introduced in a few non-frontline but strategically vital hromadas like the embattled cities of Sumy and Chernihiv or communities with nuclear power plants. This arrangement was not conceived as a permanent rollback of decentralisation but as a response to the acute need for rapid decision-making and a unified command in wartime. Nonetheless, it has de jure produced two distinct governance scenarios in Ukraine: one in which a fully centralised state apparatus operates in hromadas where local self-government bodies have been replaced by military administrations,  and another where local self-government bodies remain but must extensively coordinate with district and regional authorities.

Yet, field interviews in the war-affected regions of Chernihiv, Kherson, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia demonstrate continuity in the operation of local governance and service provision. This has been particularly important in municipalities where elected councils can no longer operate effectively. In some frontline and occupied hromadas, council members have fled, been killed, or in some cases collaborated with Russian forces. As a result, many councils lack a quorum and cannot convene, while new elections are impossible for security reasons. In these situations, military administrations have become the institutional lifeline for local governance.

In the case of occupied hromadas, military administrations operate remotely – often from nearby oblast centres or even from Kyiv. Their core functions include assisting internally displaced persons from the hromadas in question, establishing evacuation routes, collecting intelligence, and preparing for post-liberation governance, while their ability to provide direct local services remains extremely limited.

Military in name, civilian in essence

The military administrations are an extension of the central government’s executive branch. The same goes for their leadership: The heads of local military administrations are appointed by presidential decree and, in most cases, they are not military officers at all. Thus, although created to address wartime security demands, the military administrations remain essentially civilian in character – and military largely only in name.

Unlike hromadas with elected councils, in those under military administrations formal democratic processes like local council sessions have been suspended and decision-making is in the hands of the head of the military administration.

At the same time, many of these heads retain a degree of local legitimacy. Around one in three newly appointed heads of local military administration in urban hromadas were previously elected mayors of the same municipalities in 2020. This continuity has been crucial for upholding local trust.

Risks to local integrity and ownership

Nevertheless, the current wartime framework poses two major risks. First, the legal ambiguity surrounding the circumstances under which military administrations can be established leaves room for the abuse of political power. While our field research has revealed no explicit cases of such abuse, this leeway could undermine democratic accountability, especially if martial law is prolonged.

Second, in Ukraine’s emerging recovery framework, control over reconstruction funds appears increasingly centralised. While central management makes it easier to coordinate with international donors, it also weakens hromadas’ sense of ownership over rebuilding efforts. If local priorities are sidelined in favour of a centralised allocation system, communities may struggle to restore both physical infrastructure and the trust that underpins resilience.

Why reconstruction should bear the hallmark of decentralisation

As the war continues, the future of Ukrainian decentralisation depends on how effectively the country reconciles military necessity with democratic safeguards. The post-war recovery process will be a critical test. If reconstruction is overly centralised, it could erode local legitimacy and reverse hard-won reforms. Nobel laureate Roger Myerson underlined this danger at a recent conference, arguing that Ukraine’s decentralisation reforms must guide the reconstruction process. For Myerson, empowering hromadas is crucial not only because local leaders have been at the forefront of defence and relief, but also because decentralisation increases transparency, fosters competition and innovation among municipalities, and strengthens democratic resilience. He warned that large-scale donor assistance, if channelled primarily through central authorities, could unintentionally reinforce centralisation. Instead, donors should actively involve local governments in project design and oversight, establish regional offices to support hromadas, and allocate a significant share of international funds – at least 25 per cent – to the local level. Such mechanisms, Myerson argued, would ensure a recovery that is faster and more transparent and accountable.

A return to robust local autonomy could ensure that decentralisation remains a cornerstone of Ukraine’s democratic development. The current moment is thus not only about wartime survival. It is also about preserving the institutional DNA of Ukraine’s decentralisation reform, which has been key to both resilience and democratic consolidation.

The research that led to this piece was supported by the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies (FBEES), grant number 23-GP-009.

Andrii Darkovich is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) in Ukraine and a researcher at the KSE Institute and KSE University.

Maryna Rabinovych is an assistant professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) in Ukraine and a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Social Sciences at the Arctic University of Norway (UiT). Since October 2024, she has also been a fellow in the Ukraine Research Network@ZOiS, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research