Security through Education: Estonia’s Language Transition
One-fifth of Estonians have Russian roots. To integrate this minority better, the government has decided to phase out Russian-language education. New ZOiS research looks at how this policy has been greeted across Estonian society – and particularly in the Russian-speaking community.
In Estonia, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine gave new urgency to debates about how to integrate the country’s large Russian-speaking population. Since then, efforts to implement Estonian-only education across the board have gained momentum. The Estonian government decided in late 2022 that, starting in 2024, all state-funded education will shift to Estonian by 2030. Schools and kindergartens where Russian is the language of instruction will be phased out in a policy which, it is claimed, will improve not only social integration but also the economic prospects of Russian speakers.
As part of the ERC-funded research project MoveMeRU, we conducted a survey of 2,000 people in Estonia in the autumn of 2025, deliberately including a disproportionally high share of respondents with a Russian background (1,018).[1] The survey sought to gauge people’s attitudes to the transition to Estonian-only education, and it revealed pronounced differences between the Russian minority and the rest of the population on this issue.
Dividing lines: language, migration background, age and income
Russian-language education has been a contentious issue in Estonia since the 1990s. In Estonian law, Russian is considered a ‘foreign’ language, even if nearly 30 per cent of the population, including ethnic Ukrainians and Belarusians, see it as their mother tongue. As of 2025, ethnic Russians constitute 20.9 per cent of the population.
Our data shows significant variation in approval rates for the language transition (see graph). More than 80 per cent of ethnic Estonians approve of the proposed reform. In contrast, among those with a Russian background roughly 35 per cent of respondents aged 35 and older and just over 50 per cent of younger respondents are in favour of the policy. This tallies broadly with the values and divisions identified in a Turu-uuringute AS survey from December 2023.
Language and migration background are not the only lines of division here. Regardless of their ethnic background, better-off respondents are significantly more likely to approve of the policy. The overall population aged under 35 is also more supportive of the transition. In addition, our data speaks to regional differences: Approval rates are lowest in Ida-Viru county on the border with Russia, where ethnic Russians account for 73 per cent of the population. The language in which respondents were schooled is also important. Those who were educated through Estonian are more likely to support the policy, while those whose schooling was in Russian are more likely to oppose it.
Opposition in principle and on practical grounds
The survey included an open-ended question where respondents were asked how they felt about the transition and what they thought it was meant to achieve. This question was answered by nearly 95 per cent of respondents, most frequently by those with a Russian background aged under 35 and less so by other respondents in the same age bracket.
Negative responses among those respondents with a Russian background fall into two main categories. Some criticise the perceived assimilationist or discriminatory character of the policy. For example, in the opinion of a woman (59) from Ida-Viru county, the policy’s ultimate goal is to ‘deprive Russian children of their future’. A young man (25) claimed similarly that the aim was ‘to torment and upset all Russian-speaking students’. And a respondent (64) based in Tallinn complained that the transition was intended ‘to humiliate Russians’ and alleged that ‘Estonian-language courses for adults were weak, few and far between, and just for show. And now, having failed to accomplish this task [getting Russian speakers to learn Estonian], the state is switching all education to Estonian in the absence of teachers and teaching methods.’
Other Russian-background respondents oppose the policy on practical grounds, homing in on the lack of qualified teachers, the poor standard of teaching, or the hasty implementation. One woman (41) was in favour of the policy, but claimed that ‘its implementation is a complete mess. Teachers are not ready. […] Textbooks are not ready. […] There is no methodology.’ This echoes criticisms voiced in the public debate. Teachers complain about the heavy workload, the lack of adequate teaching materials, and the insufficient level of Estonian-language skills, which makes their task especially difficult. In our survey, a small share of ethnic Estonian respondents were also sceptical about the practicability of the policy.
Support even among Estonians with a Russian background
Alongside criticism we find praise for the language transition, even among individuals with a Russian background, and in particular among those who took the survey in Estonian. They emphasise the goal of social cohesion and the potential economic rewards that better integration will bring their children. When parents support the transition, their children are more likely to go along with it. A positive attitude was common among Russians living in Tallinn. One woman (34) hoped that the policy would lead to a decrease in unemployment in the Russian-speaking community ‘since it is difficult to find a job without knowing the language’. Others believed that the transition should have taken place a long time ago.
The non-Russian respondents were rather unanimous in their approval. In their responses to the open-ended question, many mentioned the importance of social cohesion and the threat posed by Russia’s influence over Estonia’s Russian minority. The frustration vented by one woman (62) was typical: ‘Russians should understand that they are not privileged people who do not need to know the official language of the country.’ A man (22) from Tallinn was convinced that the policy will ‘help them [Russian speakers] to better integrate into the Estonian socio-cultural environment’ and approved of its stated goal to ‘instil patriotic feelings in the new generation’.
Alienation or integration?
The language transition is part of a wider debate on social cohesion and security in Estonia. The country has been the victim of numerous covert Russian attacks for nearly two decades. Recent examples include the violation of the national airspace by Russian fighter jets, cyberattacks, and the removal of Estonian border infrastructure by night in Narva. Russian-speaking Estonians are a key target of the Kremlin’s propaganda, and the Russian media instrumentalises Estonian minority policies with a view to stirring up animosities. Meanwhile, Estonia is trying to win the hearts and minds of its young Russian-speaking citizens. Efforts are being made to equip them with the capacity to see through Russian fake news, for instance via the Fake Detective project. Increasing social cohesion in such a highly politicised environment has thus become an existential question. While the language transition may awaken and stoke identity conflicts in some parts of society, the hope is that it will encourage greater numbers of Estonians with a Russian background to embrace an Estonian identity.
[1] A ‘Russian background’ foregrounds the socialisation experience of family members in (Soviet) Russia and captures the family’s historical migration pattern. Respondents who grew up in Russia or had at least one parent or two grandparents socialised in (Soviet) Russia were considered to have a Russian background in our sample.
Dr. Félix Krawatzek is a researcher at ZOiS and head of the research cluster ‘Youth and Generational Change’ and the ERC-funded project ‘Moving Russia(ns): Intergenerational Transmission of Memories Abroad and at Home (MoveMeRU)’.