Survey Insights on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Policy Preferences
As Ukraine weighs the future of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in court, many Ukrainians show a lack of knowledge about the Church. Yet, they still favour religious pluralism – one of the foundations of European integration.
On 3 September 2025, a court in Ukraine opened a case following an application from the country’s central government agency for religious affairs. The agency was seeking to bring to an end the legal entity of the Kyiv Metropolis of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and have its property, funds, and other assets – except for property intended for religious worship – transferred to the state. The agency claims that the UOC Kyiv Metropolis is affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC); any such affiliation is prohibited by a 2024 law in response to the ROC’s ideological support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The UOC emphasises that it is a self-governing Church that contributes to resisting the Russian aggression. Nearly one year later, the case is still ongoing.
Despite the UOC being the subject of major policy decisions and intensive legal action, however, there is a remarkable lack of essential knowledge among Ukrainians about the Church. In a Ukraine-wide survey conducted in May–June 2026 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) for a ZOiS study, respondents were asked to assess statements about the UOC as either true or false.[i] The results showed considerable gaps in Ukrainians’ awareness of basic issues.
Public awareness of the UOC
Since the UOC emerged in 1990 from the ROC Exarchate in Ukraine, all UOC decisions about clergy ordinations and appointments have been made within Ukraine, according to the Church’s official governing documents. This has been a key factor in shaping the Church’s transformation over recent decades.
However, in the ZOiS-KIIS survey, 17 per cent of participants mistakenly thought that these decisions were being made in Moscow right up until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (figure 1). Only 6 per cent of respondents correctly identified this position as false.
At the same time, 32 per cent of participants said they did not know whether this statement was true or false but would like to know. An equal share of respondents said they did not know and were not interested in finding out.
In the ZOiS-KIIS survey, respondents were also presented with the following statement: ‘On the morning of the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, that is, on 24 February 2022, Metropolitan Onufriy, the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, publicly expressed support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and for Ukrainian warriors.’ Thirteen per cent correctly identified this statement as true, while only 5 per cent mistakenly thought it was false (figure 2).
Remarkably, 42 per cent of respondents said they did not know whether the statement was true or false but would like to know – a strikingly large share lacking important information despite being interested in it.
Through these and other questions, the survey data show that only a minority of Ukraine’s population has an informed opinion of the UOC: the proportion of respondents who correctly identified the answers to four statements about the Church varied from 6 to 22 per cent. At the same time, at least one-third were interested in having adequate basic information about the UOC, while another third were both uninformed and indifferent – that is, they expressed no interest in learning about the matter.
Policy preferences towards Orthodox Churches
Amid the perils of the ongoing war, Ukrainians have a pluralist outlook in their religious policy preferences. Asked what the state policy should be towards Ukraine’s Orthodox Churches, 51 per cent of respondents chose the option ‘There may be different Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, provided that all of them respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, are against the Russian invasion, and bless the defence of Ukraine.’ By contrast, 16 per cent thought that when it comes to the Orthodox faith, the state should follow the principle of ‘One Nation – One Church’ – that is, there should be only one Orthodox Church (figure 3).
A pluralist approach is supported equally by Ukraine’s two largest Orthodox Churches − the UOC and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) – with 57 per cent and 56 per cent of the two Churches’ affiliates, respectively, declaring their preference for a pluralist approach. At the same time, the ‘One Nation – One Church’ view is supported by minor shares of believers in both Churches, being somewhat more popular in the OCU (26 per cent) than in the UOC (15 per cent).
Uniting around values
Ukraine has expressed its firm commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and European integration. This commitment is essential for consolidating international support in defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty. To design and implement policies in the spirit of good governance, it is essential that accurate information is easily and widely available in society, that resistance to the invasion is acknowledged and appreciated across the population, and that wartime policies remain within European frameworks. The resilience and strength of a pluralist society lie in being united around the values of Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratic future, regardless of the cultural identities shaped by complex historical trajectories.
Dr Olena Bogdan is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Since September 2025, she has been a fellow at the Ukraine Research Network@ZOiS, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space.
[i] The survey was supported by the Ukraine Research Network@ZOiS (UNET), a project funded by the German Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space. A total of 2,007 interviews were conducted via mobile phone by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) from 7 May to 3 June 2026. Participants were 18 years old or older and lived in territories controlled by the government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories currently occupied by Russia or citizens who left Ukraine after 24 February 2022.