Kazakhstan: Yet Another New Constitution

A constitution is the legal and political foundation of a state. Typically, therefore, there are significant hurdles to overcome before a constitution can be amended. Nevertheless, amendments may be necessary to prevent law and reality from drifting too far apart. Very often, however, they are viewed as problematical because they turn the constitution into a political bargaining chip. Kazakhstan is about to embark on its third constitution since independence some 35 years ago. In addition, the constitution has been changed, in some cases extensively, on six occasions. Based on the timeline and content of the latest reform, the new constitution would appear to reflect a willingness to adapt – but it is, first and foremost, a politically motivated device for the consolidation of power.

A fast-tracked constitutional reform

Kazakhstan’s previous constitutional history bears the strong imprint of the country’s first President, Nursultan Nazarbayev. In 1995, he replaced what was, nominally, a parliamentary constitution – which had come into force just two years earlier – with a presidential one and, in subsequent years, dramatically expanded his personal power via various constitutional amendments. In response to the unrest in early January 2022, which was an expression of popular discontent as well as internal power struggles, these amendments were reversed by his successor Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Further reforms hinted at a cautious political liberalisation. At the same time, Tokayev announced in 2022 that no further constitutional changes were planned.

And yet just four years later, in 2025, it was the President himself who, by announcing the abolition of the upper house of Parliament (Senate), provided the impetus not only for a further constitutional reform but ultimately for an entirely new constitution. Contrary to his initial announcement, the reform process was a rushed affair: the decision in favour of a new constitution was taken in January 2026, the proposal was published on 12 February 2026 and the referendum scheduled soon afterwards, on 15 March. No official explanation for this sudden haste has been provided, but it was clearly a deliberate political strategy. The short timeframe hampered public debate of the proposal. Indeed, a number of activists, bloggers and journalists, as well as a well-known lawyer, were arrested after they voiced criticism of individual provisions or called for a boycott of the referendum. As expected, 87.15 per cent of the population voted in favour of the new constitution and turnout was high.

Alignment and power play

The most significant changes within the political system are the establishment of a unicameral parliament (Kurultai), whose members will – as was the case until 2022 – once again be elected purely via a system of proportional representation, and the introduction of the post of Vice-President, who will be nominated by the President and merely confirmed in office by Parliament. His tasks are outlined in the constitution in very broad terms. Both these institutions existed under Kazakhstan’s first constitution of 1993. By contrast, an entirely new constitutional body has been created: the People’s Council (Halyq Kenesi), in which representatives of the ethnocultural associations, public organisations and local and regional assemblies, who are appointed by the President, will act in a consultative capacity but also have the right to initiate legislation.

With good will, it is possible to see these changes as measures aimed at making the work of the institutions more efficient. However, the President’s new rights of appointment raise concerns about the separation of powers, as he alone may appoint candidates to the country’s highest judicial offices, among other things. His proposals for the posts of Vice-President and Prime Minister must be confirmed by the Kurultai, but if his candidates are repeatedly rejected, the President can dissolve Parliament – and then govern by decree.

In the sphere of basic rights, many of the provisions which were still framed in very general terms in 1995 – on freedom of expression, for example – are now much more specific and restrictive. This has drawn sharp criticism from human rights activists. Much of this is an alignment with harsh reality, with some basic rights having already been curtailed, but the enshrining of these changes in the constitution marks a deterioration. The redefining of the status of the Russian language – Kazakh and Russian had equal status since 1995, but the new wording states that Russian is used alongside Kazakh – can be seen as alignment with current realities: in the early 1990s, even Kazakhs tended to speak Russian rather than Kazakh in urban areas, whereas in the 2021 census, around 50 per cent of the population claimed to use Kazakh in their daily lives.

Here, as with other amendments, the new constitution genuinely closes a gap between text and reality. As emphasised by official sources, it is thus adapted to the domestic and geopolitical changes that have taken place in recent years. The fundamental gap between the pledges of democracy in this constitution (and its predecessors) and reality remains, however. Rather, its significance lies its consolidation of the current political system.

Preserving the existing political system

According to the official narrative, the new constitution marks a break with Kazakhstan’s “super-presidential legacy” – in other words, it spells the end, once and for all, of the Nazarbayev era. This applies insofar as the power of the President, which was previously concentrated in the hands of Nazarbayev himself, will henceforth be institutionalised. However, the presidential system as such remains largely unaffected: for Tokayev, the state should “be the chief arbiter of public life and prioritise stability over freedom” – and a strong president is the guarantor of this stability.

Many commentators in and outside Kazakhstan view the timing and content of the constitutional reform not only in terms of its current significance but as a strategic, future-focused move that will become Tokayev’s legacy. Tokayev himself is not permitted to run for office again in 2029 and the new role of Vice-President, appointed by him, could well serve as a springboard for his preferred successor. The extensive rights to appoint candidates would help him balance the interests of rival influential groups. The new constitution, observers say, is thus a bid to consolidate power for the long term.

If this interpretation is correct, politically motivated constitutional amendments will continue to be a necessity. As it stands, Tokayev’s legacy is therefore unlikely to mark the end of constitutional reforms in Kazakhstan.

Dr Beate Eschment is a researcher at ZOiS and an expert on Central Asia.