Why Lukashenka Plays the Anti-Putin Card

The recent release of 123 Belarusian political prisoners by the Lukashenka regime on 13 December 2025 is the latest in a series of releases of imprisoned dissidents in Belarus since July 2024. They are taking place against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. Unlike previous prisoner releases during periods of détente between Minsk and the West, for example from 2014 to 2020, this time Belarus is no longer a neutral actor. Through Minsk’s active logistical support for the Kremlin in the early months of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the country became a co-aggressor.

Paradoxically, this role coexists with a view of Belarus as both a (potential) victim of Russian expansionist policies and a mediator between the warring parties, as demonstrated by the ‘peace negotiations’ held in Belarus in February and March 2022. Even the actual victim of Russia’s aggression – Ukraine – acknowledges the contradictory role of the Lukashenka regime. This simultaneity of seemingly conflicting ‘personalities’ is a key factor in the regime’s success when it comes to conveying signals of rapprochement to at least some of its Western addressees. In the current context, the US is receptive to such signals, while the EU is not. In the past, the reverse was true.

A pattern of dissociation from Russia

There is, however, another reason for the partial effectiveness of Belarus’s current foreign policy posturing. Lukashenka, particularly through the release of his most prominent opponents in recent months, such as Sergei Tikhanovsky (released in June 2025), Viktar Babaryka and Maria Kalesnikava (both released in December 2025), has managed to communicate something else: He is not like Putin. The latter allows his fiercest opponents to die in highly suspicious circumstances (e.g. Boris Nemtsov in February 2015 and Alexei Navalny in February 2024). Minsk’s warning to Poland and Lithuania in September 2025 that Russian drones were apparently approaching EU territory also fits this pattern of dissociation from Russia in messages to the West.

Lukashenka’s show of distancing himself from the Kremlin has achieved its goal. Thanks to American sanctions waivers, Belarus can partially reestablish itself within the global community. The White House’s invitation to Minsk to join the US-led ‘Board of Peace’ in post-Hamas Gaza on 19 January 2026 is another opportunity for Belarus to return to the fold. There are signs of some progress even on the Belarusian-European track: In October 2025, European diplomats met representatives of the Belarusian regime in Paris for secret talks.

The rewards of rapprochement

The motives behind Minsk’s actions are multifaceted. For Lukashenka, a primary concern is securing a place for himself in future negotiations on a new European security order. A key aim for Minsk of such negotiations would be to obtain security guarantees for Belarus from NATO, but also from a revisionist Russia. A resolution of the war on Belarus’s doorstep would, moreover, free up the political resources needed to initiate a smooth transfer of power, something that would be difficult amid the conflict. Recent amendments to the Belarusian constitution and the law ‘On the President of Belarus’ hint that Lukashenka is plotting to keep it in the family or at least secure the immunity of his family members in any post-war scenario. There would be another peace dividend: In recent months, Lukashenka has repeatedly expressed his wish for Belarus to participate in the financially lucrative reconstruction of post-war Ukraine. Here again, Lukashenka’s dissociation from Russia becomes clear: While Putin is destroying Ukraine, Lukashenka is ostensibly willing to rebuild it.

Détente: a double-edged sword?

Yet, Lukashenka’s current manoeuvring may produce two side effects that could threaten his regime’s stability. First, from the domestic perspective, a new détente with the West could become a double-edged sword for the Belarusian leader. It would allow him to end the traumatic chapter in Belarusian history that began with the brutal crushing of the mass protests following the fraudulent 2020 presidential election and simultaneously to herald the start of a putative intra-Belarusian reconciliation period. And yet he has to be careful not to alienate the silowiki (security apparatus) within his ‘winning coalition’. In autocracies, such factions typically exploit periods of extensive repression to boost their careers and use foreign sanction regimes as opportunities for lucrative sanction-busting activities.

Second, it remains unclear how long the Belarusian regime will manage to avoid exhausting the Kremlin’s strategic patience with Lukashenka’s overtures to the West. Lukashenka’s almost crafty avoidance of supporting the Kremlin with its own foot soldiers in the war against Ukraine has been a thorn in the side of some political hawks around Putin for quite some time. This was particularly clear in the critical reactions of Kremlin-affiliated military bloggers after Lukashenka announced the withdrawal of Belarusian troops stationed at the Belarusian-Ukrainian border in July 2024.

Belarus and the EU: united by fear of the same destiny

Lukashenka’s flirt with Washington is only possible as long as the current communication channel between the White House and the Kremlin remains intact. It is the Belarusian leader’s justification to Moscow of his parallel Western pivot. Thus, it should be in Lukashenka’s interest not only to keep this channel open, but to shape it, or better still, to become the channel himself by acting as a mediator in the current American-Russian negotiation track. Only that will enable Lukashenka to prevent a scenario in which he becomes a pawn in a game between two global powers – a destiny Europe fears for itself. Here, an overlap of interests between the EU and Belarus becomes clear, which could catalyse a renewal of friendlier relations between Brussels and Minsk. Nevertheless, Lukashenka’s attempts to expand the room for political manoeuvre from the Kremlin could backfire even in the event of a ceasefire in the war against Ukraine. In his current role as an anti-Putin, the Belarusian autocrat is performing a political tightrope walk with an uncertain outcome.

Boris Ginzburg is a doctoral researcher at the Institute for East European Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin.