The Kremlin: Leaving Little to Chance in the 2026 State Duma Elections
Russians are about to vote in the first parliamentary elections since their country’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. What is the regime doing to manage uncertainty and ensure a plausible result?
The State Duma elections scheduled for 18–20 September are taking place in circumstances vastly different from all previous campaigns. These are the first Duma elections to be held while Russia is waging its full-scale war against Ukraine, and a growing number of Russian regions are facing drone attacks and other security threats. This is also the first time the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia after 2022 will participate. For the Kremlin, the main objective of these elections is to affirm the stability of the existing system and to secure a result that appears credible.
A docile Duma
In the legislative period since 2021, the Duma has effectively served as an instrument for waging war. According to Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, of the 2,980 federal laws passed in those five years, 183 were related to providing a legislative framework for the war and supporting those involved in it; around 70 concerned the integration of the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘People’s Republics’ and the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions into the Russian legal framework; and a further 250 were anti-sanctions legislation. The level of cross-faction consensus has been very high: 68.5 per cent of the laws were passed with the support of all parliamentary factions.
Indeed, consensus has been a defining characteristic of the latest Duma. Even decisions aimed at expanding the powers of the executive branch in the sphere of security passed with virtually no political opposition. For example, in May 2026, the Duma unanimously approved a law expanding the president’s powers to deploy Russian armed forces abroad to ‘protect Russian citizens’.
For the Kremlin, the September elections are therefore not merely about electing a new parliament. They are meant to ensure the continuation of a model in which the Duma rubberstamps the regime’s key decisions without becoming a forum for discussion, let alone criticism, of the country’s political course.
To hold or not to hold elections?
This spring, government circles discussed the possibility of postponing or effectively cancelling the Duma elections due to the war and the general instability in the country. Senior FSB officials and the head of the Russian National Guard Viktor Zolotov lobbied for this course of action. However, concerned that a postponement might have sent a strong signal of weakness, the Presidential Administration allowed the elections to go ahead, and on 22 August, Vladimir Putin publicly emphasized that Russia would hold them even in difficult conditions.
The chair of the Central Election Commission (CEC) Ella Pamfilova has also acknowledged the ‘unprecedentedly difficult conditions’ in which the elections are taking place and stated that counter-terrorism would be a priority in the campaign. For areas under martial law – the occupied Ukrainian territories in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia – the CEC has established specific procedures for the formation of electoral commissions and has provided for the possibility of early voting. Photography and/or video recording are restricted during the elections. Should any security threats arise, the elections will be suspended and the documentation taken to a secure location.
Thus, security is not merely an external backdrop to the campaign, but an integral part of the electoral process itself. Ironically, elections meant to demonstrate normality and institutional continuity are happening in a situation the authorities describe as an emergency.
Lowering expectations for a plausible result
A particularly intriguing aspect of the campaign centres on what result the Kremlin will deem optimal. In the spring, the regions were advised not to inflate the figures ‘grossly and artificially’, and the 2021 result – 49.8 per cent for party lists with a turnout of 51.72 per cent – was discussed as an acceptable benchmark. Previously, regional authorities had been given a more ambitious target – at least 55 per cent of the vote with a turnout of 55 per cent. In July, expectations were lowered further, initially to around 50 per cent, and then, for some regions, to 45 per cent, while the desired turnout remained at around 50 per cent. The reasons for this expectation management include rising prices, fuel shortages, public war fatigue, and falling approval ratings for the ruling party and the president. The dynamics here are crucial: The authorities require not just a strong result, but a strong result that does not diverge too sharply from public sentiment. Too low a percentage might signal a weakening of the government’s authority; but too high a percentage could undermine the credibility of the results.
The Yabloko mystery
To the surprise (and delight) of many experts, on 29 July the Central Electoral Commission registered the Yabloko party’s list for the State Duma elections. This news was all the more surprising given that the party was campaigning under the slogan ‘For peace and freedom! For a life without fear!’ at a time when the military rhetoric of other parties was becoming increasingly inflammatory. Thousands of posts in support of Yabloko appeared on social media. However, the joy was short-lived. As early as 10 August, the Russian Supreme Court disqualified Yabloko from the elections after the ultra-patriotic Rodina party filed a lawsuit accusing it of numerous breaches of electoral law.
Why register a party only to withdraw it from the election straight away? Experts have put forward several explanations, some far-fetched (there is no such thing as Yabloko), others less radical (a miscalculation by the authorities). Unfortunately, none of them can be verified. I shall venture to add my own explanation: In my view, no one ever intended to allow Yabloko to stand in the elections. It was nothing more than a brief and relatively low-risk experiment, entirely orchestrated by the administration – a test of the ‘admission effect’. They tested it – and quickly called off the experiment.
What to expect after 20 September
The most likely scenario is that United Russia will retain its dominant position and, possibly, a constitutional majority. The mainstream opposition parties are also likely to retain their representation. Yet, this does not mean that the elections are politically meaningless. Beyond the distribution of seats, other indicators matter: voter turnout, regional variations, and the proportion of new MPs linked to the war. They will give an indication of the extent to which the Kremlin deems it necessary to make personnel changes.
There is much speculation about what might follow after 20 September. The post-election measures under discussion range from further tightening of repressive and foreign-exchange legislation to additional restrictions on VPNs, budget cuts and other unpopular decisions. In addition, there is talk of both a new mobilization and restrictions on leaving the country. Thus, the elections are seen as a turning point, after which the authorities will have the leeway to take decisions that would be too risky in the heat of the election campaign.
The 2026 State Duma elections are a test of the Russian authoritarian regime’s ability to maintain institutional normality in abnormal times. Their outcome, in terms of the parliamentary majority, appears relatively predictable. Far less predictable are the specifics of this outcome and how the authorities will interpret the mandate they receive. And will they succeed in striking a balance between control and plausibility? The Kremlin needs to ensure United Russia’s continued dominance, demonstrate the state’s stability, integrate war veterans into the political elite, and at the same time avoid producing a result that appears excessively contrived. This is not a campaign for any changes within the regime, but for a convincing affirmation of its ability to continue with the current course.
Irina Busygina is a political scientist and a researcher at ZOiS. She is also a research scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University and a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington, DC.