Russia and Armenia’s 2026 Parliamentary Elections

Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections will be a litmus test for the multi-vector foreign policy pursued by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Under Pashinyan, Armenia has continued to cooperate with Russia while edging closer to Europe and the West politically – but this geopolitical pathway remains controversial within Armenian society and beyond. Recent polls indicate steadily rising support for his Civil Contract party and predict the defeat of the pro-Russian opposition on 7 June. Yet, the Civil Contract’s majority in the Parliament is not guaranteed and Russia’s influence is unlikely to diminish after the elections.

Armenia’s strategic turn westwards

For decades, Armenia was politically and economically dependent on Russia. Yet since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and especially since Armenia lost the exclave of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 2023, the traditionally positive image of Russia in the Republic of Armenia has been changing. Today, it is shaped more by disappointment and frustration than by trust and friendship.

Against this background, Armenia has been diversifying its international alliances and strengthening its economic ties with the EU and the USA, while also distancing itself from Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Tellingly, Pashinyan did not attend this year’s Victory Parade in Moscow on 9 May or the summit of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in Astana on 26 May. Earlier in the month, Yerevan hosted the first ever EU-Armenia summit. US-brokered regional peace negotiations with Azerbaijan and a new connectivity deal centred on the planned Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) are further evidence of Armenia's strategic reorientation.

Interference from outside players

Yet Russia is not standing idly by as Yerevan takes steps towards greater sovereignty. It is interfering in the elections with a massive disinformation campaign aimed at garnering support for Armenia’s three pro-Russian opposition parties, especially among the country’s large share of undecided voters (22 per cent). In AI-generated fake news, ‘Doppelgänger’ media formats, and videos Pashinyan is being portrayed as a traitor, and the campaign is also stoking fears of a new war with Azerbaijan. Russia has been exerting economic pressure in the form of 'temporary bans' on Armenian exports and has warned that Armenia’s rapprochement with the EU is not compatible with its membership of the EAEU.

Interference is also coming from members of the Armenian diaspora in Russia, who tend to blame Pashinyan for ‘surrendering’ Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan and for the resulting exodus of ethnic Armenians from the former exclave. The pro-Russian opposition parties have been trying to mobilise these Russian Armenians. Reports of ‘diaspora bussing’ and the ‘possible bribery’ of some Armenian citizens living in Russia to take part in the elections have contributed to the political polarisation of Armenian society in the run-up to the elections.

Russian exiles back Pashinyan

Although most of them cannot vote in the elections, the Russian citizens who emigrated to Armenia after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine are closely following the campaign. They tend to be liberal and pro-European in their political attitudes and most fear a government led by a Russia-aligned party. In fact, this possibility has led many of them to contemplate leaving Armenia, which has up to now been seen as a welcoming ‘safe harbour’. To understand their concerns, we conducted face-to-face interviews with Russian migrants, local Armenian experts and Russian Armenians in Yerevan and Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city and the location of Russia’s 102^nd Military Base.

From the interviews it emerged that the concerns of Russian migrants centre on Russia-linked economic elites and the Russian military presence in Armenia, both of which are viewed as symbols of Russia’s enduring influence. Many were dismayed when confronted with the faces of wealthy Russian-Armenian candidates smiling down at them from election billboards and worried that their strong visibility and financial resources could secure more votes for the pro-Russian parties. Importantly, these concerns were not only voiced by Russian migrants; similar anxieties were also expressed by Russian Armenians from Yerevan, indicating that fears of deepening Russian influence resonate more broadly within Armenian society.

For many of the Russian migrants we interviewed, Georgia’s recent authoritarian turn should serve as a warning to Armenia. As one interviewee explained, ‘everyone is afraid that some pro-Russian party might win, like in Georgia, and everything will get worse really quickly.’ However, as the political scientist Jenny Paturyan (American University of Armenia, Yerevan) emphasised in an interview in May 2026, the Georgian scenario is possible but would be much more difficult to implement in Armenia given the strength of the country’s civil society.

Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party are seen by most Russian migrants as the best option for Armenia now, mostly because of the prime minister’s efforts to reach a peace deal with Azerbaijan. To quote one of our interviewees, ‘Especially in a moment in which my country is at war, I support any peace agreement, any reconciliation, any ceasefire.’ While many trust Pashinyan to limit Russian influence without provoking Russia, fears of tightening legal regulations for Russians in Armenia and possible extraditions persist. The ongoing negotiations on the TRIPP and the controversial reopening of the railway connecting Kars to Gyumri were viewed as positive, but raised fears of a potential Russian reaction.

The election results will be decisive for Russian-Armenian relations and the geopolitical future of the region. Nikol Pashinyan is performing a delicate balancing act: confidently advancing a multi-vector foreign policy while also preserving Armenia’s economic and cultural cooperation with Russia. The diversification of Armenia’s international alliances does not mean that Russia will lose interest in it as a buffer zone next to NATO member Turkey. Moreover, Russia will remain an important economic actor in the region. The EU should support Armenia in advancing strategic reforms without entirely rejecting its foreign policy.

Tsypylma Darieva is a senior researcher at ZOiS, head of the research cluster ‘Migration and Diversity’ and co-leader of the ZOiS Caucasus Network.

Marika Murgioni is a PhD researcher at the University of Padua and Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. She is currently writing her dissertation on Armenian-Russian Relations in a Post-Soviet Urban Context: Power Dynamics, Identity Negotiations, and Social Changes in the City of Gyumri.