Orbán-Trump Relations: A Blessing or a Curse?
Shortly before the parliamentary elections in Hungary, the ruling Fidesz party is trailing behind the opposition party Tisza in the polls. To secure his re-election, Prime Minister Orbán is counting on support from US President Trump. However, it is not clear whether Trump can provide the necessary boost.
On 12 April, Hungary will hold a parliamentary election. The opposition is leading the polls, while the government is being shaken by one scandal after another. The regime’s election campaign has shown little novelty, instead resorting to fear mongering, just like all of its previous campaigns. Time and again, the government has exploited a fear of immigrants ruining the country, and four years ago it used the trope of a vague fear of an unspecified war. This time, according to the regime, Hungarians should fear not only a war that Brussels might force on the country but also the costs of supporting Ukraine.
One way that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán hopes to buttress his position is with a visit by US President Donald Trump right before the election. Standing next to Trump in Budapest would, Orbán believes, offer him the opportunity to demonstrate his global statesmanship and influence. But despite Orbán’s high hopes for Trump’s presidency, it has not so far offered him the benefits he desired. Often, quite the opposite.
Optimistic Orbán meets truculent Trump
When Trump was re-elected in 2024, Orbán said that the president’s second term would bring about a new dawn for the West and that the White House would finally be occupied by a friend who would help him fight so-called liberals in Hungary and the EU. Orbán envisaged himself as a mediator, someone with connections to both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin who could shape world politics by standing next to the US leader.
The reality has proved different. Although rhetorically Trump has always supported Orbán, in practical terms one disappointment has followed another. Trump has often shown disdain towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky – which pleased Orbán – while at other times turning against Putin and even demanding that Europe stop importing Russian energy – a scenario that displeased Orbán, because it would have terminated a lucrative business for the government and its cronies, who have profited from buying cheaply in Russia and selling expensively at home.
Nor have Orbán’s interactions with Trump provided the Hungarian premier with the prestige and aura of a global leader that he had hoped for. Orbán has not enjoyed Trump’s confidence, and he seems to learn about Trump’s moods and policies from the news, just like anybody else.
This in itself would not have been a problem, as most observers are in the dark when it comes to trying to guess Trump’s next move – perhaps even Trump himself. The problem was that the Hungarian media, which parrot the regime’s and, often, Putin’s propaganda, portrayed Orbán as a leader who could foresee what was coming, enjoyed Trump’s confidence, and perhaps could even pull some strings.
The announcement in October 2025 of a would-be meeting between Trump and Putin offers a telling example. When the summit was trailed, it was depicted as a clear confirmation of Orbán’s leadership and significance, with Budapest heralded as the place where the war in Ukraine would finally be ended. Indeed, a meeting in the Hungarian capital would have been a blessing for Orbán and a slap in the face for the EU.
But merely announcing a meeting was not enough for the regime’s propaganda machinery, and exaggerated commentary followed. Newspapers discussed how well-informed Orbán was, with his earlier actions revealing that he must have known about this meeting since the summer. The regime’s triumphalism was overwhelming, and Orbán’s foreign policy was portrayed as strategic mastery.
Yet just a few days later came the shocking disappointment that the meeting would not take place after all. What made it humiliating for Orbán was not the cancellation itself but the fact that it proved he had not been consulted or invited to the table where decisions were made. He was simply the leader of a small country of little significance.
Orbán’s long-awaited visit to Washington in November 2025 unfolded somewhat similarly. The prime minister claimed to have achieved much, returning home having apparently received a ‘bullet-proof’ economic security shield. But not long afterwards came Trump’s frustrating correction: ‘No, I didn’t promise him [an economic shield], but he certainly asked for it.’
The fact that Hungary is an EU member makes Orbán a useful Trojan horse in Brussels for Trump or Putin. Orbán may also be pleased by Trump’s confrontations with the bloc. Yet his pleasure is paradoxical, because Trump’s moves against the EU also hurt Hungary. Tariffs on European exports, for example, can hit the Hungarian economy hard, which is especially inconvenient for Orbán at a time when the economy has been stagnating for the last four years, contributing to people’s dissatisfaction with the regime.
A tall order for the opposition
With the election just weeks away, the regime’s previously smooth propaganda machine seems to be sputtering. Still, the government has a hold over the Hungarian media, and the electoral system works in Orbán’s favour. To push him out of power, the opposition must achieve a crushing victory.
Despite the scandals, mismanagement, and weak economic performance, Orbán is trying to portray himself as the only person who can protect Hungarians from war and from Ukraine. Why? Because he is the man who knows the leaders who matter, Putin and Trump. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Budapest after the Munich Security Conference in early February, but he is not a real celebrity and does not have the same marketing value. Orbán would like to have Trump instead. But Trump is busy fighting a new war with Iran, which does not fit well with Orban’s narrative about the peaceful new world he and his populist friends are creating.
Ákos Kopper is an associate professor at the Institute of Political and International Studies at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest and a research fellow at the European University Institute in Florence.