Connectivity and the Entrenchment of Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan, Serbia and Georgia

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Connectivity has become a central concept in contemporary policy debates. It refers to the facilitation of trade, mobility and economic integration across countries and regions. Infrastructure projects, including roads, highways, ports and urban redevelopment initiatives, are a key element of connectivity and are often framed as instruments of progress, modernisation and prosperity.

This report focuses on Azerbaijan, Serbia and Georgia — three countries where national discourses are increasingly shaped by connectivity debates. Our study shows that in this time of seismic geopolitical shifts, small countries like Azerbaijan, Serbia and Georgia seek to assert themselves in the global politics of large-scale transregional connectivity and to reimagine their ‘peripheral’ geographical positions as new logistics ‘hubs’ in international supply chains. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Serbia, including expert and stakeholder interviews, participant observation and site visits, this report demonstrates that the large-scale connectivity projects serve political purposes that extend well beyond their stated developmental goals.

This report argues that infrastructure projects frequently serve to consolidate authoritarian power while shaping regional geopolitical alignments. Our research reveals how such projects reinforce authoritarianism in Azerbaijan, Serbia and Georgia through three mechanisms, albeit to different degrees: ZOiS Report 3 / 2026 Connectivity and the Entrenchment of Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan, Serbia and Georgia.

• Rhetoric capture. Governments present infrastructure as evidence of progress. The visible delivery of outputs such as roads, ports and other public goods lends them legitimacy. In Azerbaijan, Baku’s Waterfront Promenade, luxury hotels, iconic architecture and the upgrading of the country’s image as a ‘hub of hubs’ between Europe and Asia showcase the regime’s modernisation agenda to both domestic and international audiences. In Serbia, the Belgrade Waterfront project and the Metro are publicly linked to President Vučić’s personal political legacy, while the Georgian leadership highlights the East–West Highway and the Port of Anaklia as hallmarks of national development. These narratives position political leaders as indispensable drivers of modernisation and progress.
• Centralisation and elite co-optation. Project planning and implementation are concentrated in central ministries, with no role foreseen for local authorities and communities. In Azerbaijan, the Baku Promenade is managed directly by central ministries, with economic benefits flowing to politically connected elites. In Serbia, the routing of the metro and flagship development projects favour companies with close ties to the ruling party. In Georgia, the Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure tightly controls resettlement processes and contracting and simultaneously undermines public participation. This centralisation secures loyalty and strengthens elite networks, thereby reinforcing authoritarian structures.
• External legitimation. Partnerships with China, Turkey, the European Union (EU) or multilateral development banks (MDBs) — provide authoritarian governments, especially in states with budget or construction capacity constraints, with financial support, technical know-how and international credibility. Irrespective of the source of financing, the governance of major infrastructure projects tends to violate social and legal standards. Poor project governance is evident in both Serbia and Georgia regardless of whether the project financing comes from China or MDBs. While resource-rich Azerbaijan does not depend on external financing for its infrastructure projects, it engages transregionally to bolster its image. In all three cases, the result is an infrastructure landscape in which authoritarianism can thrive. The interplay of these mechanisms demonstrates that infrastructure is more than a technical or economic tool. It is a political instrument that can be used to consolidate authoritarian control and shape regional realignments in a time of geopolitical shifts. Large-scale projects such as the Middle Corridor, Anaklia Port, and strategic urban redevelopments integrate Azerbaijan, Serbia and Georgia into new Eurasian cross-border networks, often by circumventing Western-led normative agendas. While transparency, local participation and institutional safeguards remain critical levers for mitigating authoritarian capture, their effectiveness is limited when regimes have access to sources of financing and expertise with less stringent requirements, such as China. Recognising these political dimensions is essential for understanding domestic power dynamics and broader Eurasian geopolitical restructuring.

The interplay of these mechanisms demonstrates that infrastructure is more than a technical or economic tool. It is a political instrument that can be used to consolidate authoritarian control and shape regional realignments in a time of geopolitical shifts. Large-scale projects such as the Middle Corridor, Anaklia Port, and strategic urban redevelopments integrate Azerbaijan, Serbia and Georgia into new Eurasian cross-border networks, often by circumventing Western-led normative agendas. While transparency, local participation and institutional safeguards remain critical levers for mitigating authoritarian capture, their effectiveness is limited when regimes have access to sources of financing and expertise with less stringent requirements, such as China. Recognising these political dimensions is essential for understanding domestic power dynamics and broader Eurasian geopolitical restructuring.