‘Images of Russia are a convenient way of channelling disappointment and anger’

As a political scientist, your work is actually centred on East European studies. What observation prompted you to write this book?  

Eastern Europe doesn’t just begin in some faraway place; it’s also very much present here in Germany, not least through the public discourse on Russia’s war against Ukraine. The numerous references by East German politicians and the media to the supposed closeness of East Germans to Russia – which seems to be taken for granted – have long given me pause. Why does this seem so logical to so many people, and why is it so rarely questioned? The Soviet Union of the past is not the Russia of today. And just how the former occupying power has come to be viewed in a positive light, or how this positive memory has carried over to today’s relationship with Russia, requires, at the very least, some explanation. At the same time, I have observed how public interest in Ukraine – and thus in the reality of the war – is waning. In the final part of my study, I wanted to gain a better understanding of the role the war actually plays in people’s perceptions of security in Germany.

To what extent can historical experiences explain the affinity with Russia ascribed to East Germans by the media and, in some cases, in their own accounts?

Eastern and western Germany are now rather imprecise points of comparison, although this contrast still plays a major role in socio-political discourse. The claim that eastern and western Germany differ markedly in their views of Russia for historical reasons is part of the polarisation that stems from feelings like insecurity, fear and anger. Anger towards various federal governments is exploited for political ends: via projections onto Russia and by reinterpreting personal memories and experiences from the GDR era and the period of transition. Images of Russia are a convenient way of channelling disappointment and anger. A detailed analysis of survey data reveals that while an East-West divide persists on questions relating to Russia, gender, party affiliations and personal contacts with Russia also play a role. Only a minority have such contacts – around 14 per cent before 2022, and far fewer since then – and they are concentrated among the younger generation rather than in eastern Germany. In focus groups and numerous interviews with a wide variety of people, I observed that perceptions of Russia in the eastern and western federal states are essentially similar, but the historical path leading to them was different. Several elements recur in these shared images: the lack of any distinction between the Soviet Union and Russia, and the resulting blind spot regarding Ukraine, Belarus and other Eastern European states; a positive image of Gorbachev that still casts Russia in a rosy light; the latent appeal of an authoritarian leadership style; and familiar stereotypes.

A far-right party such as the AfD seeks to align itself with the Russian state, both rhetorically and through personal ties. What image of Russia is being invoked here?

The visits by AfD politicians to Russia make the party’s direct links to Russian and global authoritarian networks tangible. In Germany, the AfD, the BSW and, to some extent, Die Linke win over their voters through emotions embedded in specific images of Russia. Who, after all, does not want peace? But the call for ‘peace now’ and diplomacy does not outline a concrete path towards this goal. So it’s more about mobilising emotions than formulating a clear political programme on how Ukraine and Europe can achieve a secure peace. Similarly, it is easy to pit investment in Germany’s and NATO’s military defence capabilities against social policy. In their speeches and writings, individual AfD politicians rely on well-known tropes of Russia as an alternative to the West. These patterns of thought already existed in the 19th century and still resonate today. They are consistent with Russia’s state rhetoric. In a somewhat weaker form, they also tie in with the image of Russia as a partner and friend that dominated German policy towards Russia prior to 2022 and is closely linked to the supposed necessity of raw material supplies from Russia. This speaks to the desire for lower energy prices and the fear that the war could escalate.

To what extent can mistakes in German policy towards Russia also be explained by certain ideas of Russia?

German policy towards Russia tends to be discussed with reference to political decision-makers. In recent years, investigative research has contributed to a better understanding of the assumptions and decisions underpinning German policy towards Russia over the past decades. Above all, it has shown that conscious decisions were taken not on the basis of a lack of information on Putin and the political system in Russia, but in disregard of the available information and doubts expressed at the time. It is important to emphasise that politics emerges in interaction with society, which is both a source of ideas and a sounding board. This perspective ‘from below’ has been missing until now, and this is where my book comes in. The images people have of Russia, the way they talk about Russia, and whether Russia plays any role at all in their thinking, are picked up on by politicians and can be exploited, as the recent state-level election campaigns have shown us.

What role disinformation plays, and how effective it is, is a question often asked when it comes to Russia. What conclusions do you draw from your research for how to deal with Russian disinformation?

In times of crisis and war, disinformation plays on a sense of uncertainty and deliberately amplifies it. It is not necessarily about spreading a single viewpoint; rather, the point is precisely to spread various claims at the same time, thereby reinforcing the impression that there are always different perspectives on an issue and that the factual picture is uncertain overall. In my research on images of Russia, I have seen how little people know about Russia and, perhaps even more importantly, how little interest they have in it. It has also become clear to what extent many people push unpleasant news out of their minds and, for example, deliberately cut back on their media consumption. All of this offers a welcome opening for disinformation, both from within and from outside. So alongside the constant effort to expose false information publicly, it is also a matter of sparking interest in political issues – in this case, Russia as a political system – building media literacy and, where possible, having the state clearly attribute attacks rather than speaking vaguely of ‘forces’ that threaten the German state. The images we form of others – in this case, of Russia – have political consequences, just as looking away does.

The interview was conducted by Stefanie Orphal, who heads the Communications department at ZOiS.

Gwendolyn Sasse is the director of ZOiS and Einstein Professor for the Comparative Study of Democracy and Authoritarianism at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.