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ZOIS REPORT

**PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS IN FLUX:
IDENTITIES, WAR, AND
TRANSNATIONAL LINKAGES
IN UKRAINE, 2017-18**

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Executive summary

This report examines changes in public opinion in Ukraine (excluding the non-government controlled areas in the Donbas and Crimea) based on original survey data from 2017 and 2018. The focus is on three issues: identity (citizenship and language); the status of the Donbas and the Minsk Agreement; and relations with the EU and Russia. The key findings are the following:

- The two most dominant identities in Ukraine are ‘Ukrainian citizen’ and ‘ethnic Ukrainian’. In 2018, more people identify as ‘Ukrainian citizen’ than in 2017, and fewer people identify as ‘ethnic Ukrainians’ in 2018 compared to 2017.
- Most Ukrainians consider Ukrainian their native language. Yet, in 2018, fewer people name Ukrainian as their native language than in 2017, and the share of those indicating that Russian is their native language has increased.
- The majority of Ukrainians reject an autonomy status for the non-government controlled areas in the Donbas. Most people think that these territories should have the same status as before the war, i.e. as parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. However, the willingness to consider an autonomy status – with variation regarding its parameters – has increased from 2017 to 2018.

- Ukrainians vary significantly in their assessments of the Minsk Agreement. This diversity of views has not significantly changed, with the exception of one statement: as of 2018 fewer people think that a new international format that includes the US is needed to end the war.
- The majority of Ukrainians have no direct experience of living in the EU or Russia in the last 10 years. However, about a third of the respondents have family or friends based in Russia, and another third have family or friends who currently live in the EU. The share of the latter has increased significantly from 2017 to 2018.

Introduction

The Ukrainian state and Ukrainian politics have changed significantly since the Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea and the onset of war in the Donbas. Previous ZOiS Reports analysed the attitudes of those most directly affected by the war – the displaced in Ukraine and in Russia, as well as the resident population of the government-controlled and non-government controlled Donbas. This report widens the focus to the overall population of Ukraine (with the exception of Crimea and the non-government controlled areas in the Donbas) and traces the most recent trends and changes in public opinion with regard to different types of identity (state identity, ethnic identity, native language), the war in Donbas (the status issue, the Minsk Agreement, US involvement in the negotiations), and individual-level links to Russia and the EU (direct migration experience, contact with family members/friends abroad).

The survey data on which this report is based is from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). KIIS regularly conducts an all-Ukrainian public opinion poll ‘Opinions and Views of Ukrainian People’. For the KIIS surveys in May–June 2017 and May–June 2018, the Centre for Eastern European and International Studies (ZOiS) commissioned a series of specific questions. KIIS applied a stratified random sample design, and interviews were held with respondents from 110 settlements in Ukraine (2017: 2,040 respondents; 2018: 2,025 respondents).

It is important to keep in mind that the present analysis deals with cross-sectional rather than panel-data. Thus, it captures opinions from different sets of people at two points in time rather than from the same group of people over time. The graphs in this report capture the results of each poll, but a mere comparison of these descriptive statistics could lead to false conclusions: differences in the percentages between the 2017 and 2018 samples may stem from the specific socio-demographic composition of the respective sample (e.g. gender, age, education). Thus, this report includes the results of logistic regression models that control for the main socio-demographic effects and investigate the links between the two samples as well as factors accounting for the reported trends.

Identities: State, ethnicity and language

Civic and ethnic identities


Respondents were asked to choose the identity most important to them from a list of ten different options, such as ‘Ukrainian citizen’, ‘ethnic Ukrainian’, ‘ethnic Russian’, ‘European’ etc. The descriptive statistics in ► FIGURE 1 show that two options were by far the most prevalent ones: ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ and ‘Ukrainian citizen’. These two identity categories developed in opposite directions: the ethnic identity appears to become less important, while the civic identity tied to the Ukrainian state seems to become stronger. In 2017, 46 per cent of the respondents chose ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ as their main identity; compared to about 37 per cent of the 2018 sample. Conversely, ‘Ukrainian citizenship’ was chosen by about 38 per cent of respondents in the 2017 sample and by 49 per cent in the 2018 sample. Our regression analysis confirms that the change from 2017 to 2018 in the chances of choosing ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ or ‘Ukrainian citizen’ as a respondent’s main identity is significant irrespective of the somewhat different socio-demographic profile of the two samples.

In both samples, socio-demographic factors had an effect on the identity choice. Among the control variables, gender, income and region had significant effects on identity choice across both years. Overall, men were 22 per cent less likely to choose ‘Ukrainian citizen’ as their main identity. Being

Identification with the Ukrainian state has increased.

Gender, income and region had significant effects on identity choice.

FIGURE 1
What personal identity is currently most important to you?



Source: ZOIS

part of a higher income group translated into a higher chance (by 11 per cent) to self-identify as a ‘Ukrainian citizen’. Furthermore, people in Central Ukraine were twice as likely to choose citizenship as their main identity, compared to people in Western Ukraine. As for the category ‘ethnic Ukrainian’, the only socio-demographic variable with a significant impact across both samples was gender: men had a 34 per cent higher chance than women to say that they primarily think of themselves as ‘ethnic Ukrainians’.

Language identities


Language identities can be different from both citizenship and ethnic identities. The ZOiS survey question asked about the more symbolic category ‘native language’ rather than language practice. It allowed for the choice between ‘Ukrainian’, ‘Russian’, ‘both Ukrainian and Russian’ and ‘other’.

► **FIGURE 2** displays the descriptive statistics for 2017 and 2018. The majority of the respondents (about 68 per cent in 2017 and 59 per cent in 2018) said that they considered Ukrainian to be their native language. The choices ‘Russian’ and ‘both Ukrainian and Russian’ were less prevalent but increased from 13 to 20 per cent and from 19 to 21 per cent respectively between samples.

Russian remains an important native language – on its own and as part of a bilingual definition of native language.

The main descriptive difference between the 2017 and the 2018 samples partly holds when controlling for socio-demographic differences between the two samples. The direction of change within the space of only one year is noteworthy and somewhat surprising. It seems that there is a perceived need among respondents to highlight the importance of the Russian language, possibly in response to an official discourse and recent legislation centred on the Ukrainian language and defining language as a security issue. The native language category ‘both Ukrainian and Russian’, which was clearly an important choice for a sizeable number of respondents in 2017 and 2018, did not exhibit a significant difference between the two years.

FIGURE 2
What language do you consider to be your native language?



Source: ZOiS

Several socio-demographic factors shaped the native language choices in both years. Men were 25 per cent more likely to say that Ukrainian is their native language than women; the chances for the urban population were 58 per cent lower, and for people with higher education the odds were 33 per cent lower. Living in Western Ukraine significantly increased the likelihood of identifying with the Ukrainian language compared to people living in Central, Southern or Eastern Ukraine. For people describing themselves as Ukrainian Greek Catholics (concentrated in Western Ukraine), the odds were more than fifteen times as high as for people of other confessions. Among followers of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate the odds to consider Ukrainian one's native language were 52 per cent lower compared to people following the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate.

A higher income level increased the chances of naming 'Russian' as one's native language, (by about 17 per cent across both samples). People living in Central, Southern or Eastern Ukraine were significantly more likely to identify with Russian as their native language than respondents in western regions (for example, residents in Eastern Ukraine had a fifteen times higher chance compared to those in Western Ukraine). In comparison to followers of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, followers of the Moscow Patriarchate were more than three times as likely to indicate that Russian was their native language.

While no significant difference could be found for the bilingual category across the two years, several socio-demographic factors had an effect in both samples. A higher age slightly reduced the chances (by 1 per cent) to say that both languages are one's native language. Conversely, living in an urban area more than doubled the chances, and being a follower of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church increased the chances by 46 per cent. Respondents from Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine were five, ten and thirteen times more likely than respondents in Western Ukraine to say that both Ukrainian and Russian were their native languages.

The status of the Donbas and the Minsk Agreement

Special status

Almost five years after the onset of war in the Donbas and at a point where the Minsk negotiation process has come unstuck, it is important to understand the Ukrainian public's perception of the negotiation process and the elements of a potential settlement. One of the ZOiS questions tried to gauge the respondents' views about the status for the non-government controlled areas or the Donbas as a whole. The Ukrainian government is opposed to the concept of autonomy, though the Minsk Agreement contains a provision for a temporary special status for specified territories in the non-government controlled areas.

The issue of autonomy or, in the language of the Minsk Agreement, 'special status' is a highly sensitive one in Ukraine. It is closely connected to the


idea of a threat to state sovereignty. Russia’s support for the self-declared people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk and its repeated calls for the federalization of Ukraine have narrowed the space for the discussion about autonomy. Nevertheless, variations of this concept are typical elements of peace agreements and conflict-management more generally.

The issue of autonomy is a highly sensitive one in Ukraine.

The ZOiS question in the KIIS survey asked the respondents to choose one of nine institutional templates. The categories included options ranging from ‘give the occupied territories the same status as before the war’ to ‘give up on the occupied territories and let them be officially or unofficially administered by Russia’. ► FIGURE 3 shows that the majority of respondents in 2017 and 2018 said that they would like the non-government controlled areas to have the same status as before the war, i.e. as parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (2017: 60 per cent; 2018: 53 per cent). All the other answer categories were met with similar approval rates in both years, with less than 10 per cent of respondents choosing any one category.


The descriptive statistics suggest that in 2018 fewer people thought that the non-government controlled areas should have the same status as before the war. Indeed, regression analysis confirms a statistically significant decrease from 2017 to 2018 in the support for a return to the status quo ante. Across both samples, the chances to opt for the ‘same status as before’ was 93 per cent higher among Ukrainian Greek Catholics than for respondents of other religious denominations, and followers of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate were 40 per cent less likely to opt for this option compared to followers of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate.

FIGURE 3
In your view, what should the government do in response to the situation in the Donbas?



Source: ZOiS

FIGURE 4
Support for any kind of autonomy



Even though the overall percentages seem low, the statistical analysis shows that significantly more people thought that the non-government controlled areas should receive a permanent autonomy status. ► **FIGURE 3** shows that in 2017 only 4 per cent of the respondents chose this option, a figure that increased to about 7 per cent by 2018. Region once again had a clear effect: respondents based in Eastern Ukraine were over three times as likely (compared to people in Western Ukraine) to agree with a permanent autonomy option, while respondents in Central Ukraine were 60 per cent less likely to favour this option, making them more critical of autonomy than those based in Western Ukraine. This finding highlights that regional differences in attitudes do not align neatly with an east-west divide, and that the less discussed central region has distinctive views on these issues. No statistically significant difference could be found between 2017 and 2018 with regard to the preferences for a temporary autonomy status or giving up on the territories.

► **FIGURE 4** displays the descriptive statistics for all answer categories expressing approval for some kind of autonomy, versus all answer categories rejecting autonomy outright. In 2017 altogether 16 per cent of the respondents supported some sort of an autonomy status; in 2018 support stood at about 25 per cent. Regression analysis confirms a significant increase by 2018. The chances of respondents from the southern and eastern regions to agree with a form of autonomy were twice and almost three times as high compared to the western macro region. Moreover, across both years, Greek Catholics were particularly sceptical of autonomy, and followers of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate were significantly less likely to support the idea than followers of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

The Minsk Agreement

The ZOiS survey questions related to the Minsk Agreement tried to establish the public mood regarding the negotiation process as well as potential add-ons like a more formalized US involvement. The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each of the following four statements on a five-step scale:

1. The Minsk process is slow, but there is no alternative to this attempt at conflict-resolution. ► **FIGURE 5**
2. Without the Minsk process there would not have been any ceasefire and the death toll would have been higher. ► **FIGURE 6**
3. Ukraine should stop participating in the Minsk negotiations as the framework demands more of Ukraine than of Russia. ► **FIGURE 7**
4. A new international format is needed that includes the US. ► **FIGURE 8**

The Ukrainian population is very diverse in its views on the Minsk Agreement.

The propensity to remain neutral on all questions was lower in 2018, and there was a tendency for the respondents in 2018 to choose the end points of the scale ('agree' or 'disagree') instead of the softer categories of 'somewhat agree' or 'somewhat disagree'. The descriptive results for all four statements confirm that the Ukrainian population is very diverse in its views on the Minsk Agreement and potential add-ons. This is most apparent in the case of the third question ('Ukraine should stop participating in the Minsk

FIGURE 5
The Minsk process is slow but there is no alternative to this attempt at conflict-resolution.




FIGURE 6
Without the Minsk process there would not have been any ceasefire and the death toll would have been higher.




FIGURE 7
Ukraine should stop participating in the Minsk negotiations as the framework demands more of Ukraine than of Russia.






FIGURE 8
A new international format for negotiation is needed that includes the US.



negotiations as the framework demands more of Ukraine than of Russia’), where answers are almost equally spread across the five different answer categories. About 60 per cent in both years agree or somewhat agree with the statement ‘Without the Minsk Process there would not have been any ceasefire and the death toll would have been higher’. The clearest position is revealed with regard to the fourth question on the need for an international format that includes the US: in 2017 and 2018, altogether around 65 per cent and 61 per cent respectively agree or somewhat agree with this statement. Regression analysis¹ reveals that only in this case there was a significant change

¹ For the regression analysis the categories ‘agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’ were collapsed, as well as the categories ‘disagree’ and ‘somewhat disagree’. The neutral middle category was coded as missing. Thus, a comparison takes place here between ‘agree / somewhat agree’ and ‘disagree / somewhat disagree’.

FIGURE 9
A UN peacekeeping mission with a mandate to eventually cover the whole territory of the occupied territories is needed to end the war.



Source: ZOIS

from 2017 to 2018: in the year 2018, significantly fewer people agreed² with the fourth statement about the need for a new international format including the US (chances to agree reduced by 44 per cent compared to 2017).

Several socio-demographic factors had a significant effect on both samples. People living in the southern or eastern regions were significantly less likely (by 67 and 83 per cent respectively) than those in Western Ukraine to agree with the statement about the need for a new international format that includes the US. Furthermore, Greek Catholics were more than twice as likely to agree than those identifying with other religious denominations. Followers of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate were half as likely to agree with the statement than followers of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Respondents in Southern and Eastern Ukraine were more than twice as likely to agree with the statement ‘The Minsk process is slow but there is no alternative to this attempt at conflict-resolution’, compared to people in Western Ukraine. Men were significantly less likely to agree.

The more leading statement ‘Ukraine should stop participating in the Minsk negotiations as the framework demands more of Ukraine than of Russia’ showed a clear regional divide: respondents in Eastern Ukraine were 70 per cent less likely to agree than those in Western Ukraine. A higher education level reduced the chances of agreeing with this statement; and Greek Catholics, compared to all other religious denominations, were more than twice as likely to agree. There was no socio-demographic factor that had a significant effect on agreeing or disagreeing with the statement ‘Without the Minsk process there would not have been any ceasefire and the death toll would have been higher’.

In the 2018 survey, the question was added whether respondents agreed with the statement that a UN peacekeeping mission with a mandate to eventually cover the whole territory of the non-government controlled territories would be needed to end the war. Public opinion with respect to this statement was rather clear-cut: more than half of the respondents agreed with the statement, and around 20 per cent chose the answer ‘somewhat agree’. Taken together, only around 20 per cent of the respondents somewhat disagreed or disagreed with this statement. ► **FIGURE 9** There is a clear east-west divide with regard to the question of UN involvement. Respondents in Eastern Ukraine were over 80 per cent less likely to agree with the proposed statement compared to those in Western Ukraine. This suggests that the population in the regions in closer vicinity to the frontline are more sceptical of new international initiatives – probably a reflection of an overall disappointment with the international engagement to date.

Mobility and personal ties to Russia and the EU

Before the war, Russia and the EU were roughly equally attractive as migration destinations for Ukrainian citizens. It is important to track the development of these personal ties during times of political confrontation at

² In the following, our analysis combines the answers ‘agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’ on the one hand and ‘disagree’ and ‘somewhat disagree’ on the other hand.

FIGURE 10
Have you lived in Russia for at least one year in the last ten years?




FIGURE 11
Have you lived in an EU country for at least one year in the last ten years?




FIGURE 12
Do you have family members or friends currently living in Russia?





FIGURE 13
Do you have family members or friends currently living in an EU country?



the state level. The ZOiS survey questions show that the overall mobility of Ukrainians remains limited: over 95 per cent of the Ukrainian respondents in 2017 and in 2018 had lived neither in Russia nor in the EU for at least one year during the last ten years. ► FIGURES 10 + 11

Reflecting the importance of transnational social ties established in migration research, both as sources of information and potential changes in perceptions, respondents were also asked whether they had family members or friends currently living in Russia or in the EU. ► FIGURES 12 + 13 About 40 per cent of the respondents in 2017 and 2018 said that they had family or friends based in Russia. Furthermore, about 24 per cent (2017) and 31 per cent (2018) reported that they had family and friends living in an EU country.

The EU has become a more important migration destination.

The regression analysis demonstrates that while there was no significant difference between having friends or family in Russia in 2017 compared to 2018, people in 2018 had a 44 per cent higher chance to say that they had family or friends in the EU compared to respondents in the 2017 sample. A higher income and higher education increased the likelihood of having friends or family in the EU by 10 per cent and over 30 per cent respectively, while a higher age slightly reduced the likelihood. Furthermore, compared to respondents in Western Ukraine, people in the south, centre and east of Ukraine were less likely to have family or friends living in the EU (chances reduced by 37, 39 and 70 per cent).

While there was no statistically significant change between the two years in terms of the personal ties to Russia, several socio-demographic factors had an effect on the two samples taken together. Living in an urban area and higher education increased the odds by 38 and 30 per cent respectively for having friends or family in Russia. People living in Southern, Central or Eastern Ukraine were more than twice as likely compared to residents in Western Ukraine to have friends or family in Russia. Finally, followers of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church were over 30 per cent less likely to have social ties to Russia.

Conclusion

This report has traced recent trends and changes in public opinion across Ukraine on selected issues. In only one year, attitudes in Ukraine have shifted quite significantly.

In only one year, attitudes in Ukraine have shifted significantly.

Most Ukrainians choose 'Ukrainian citizen' or 'ethnic Ukrainian' as their main identity. Ukrainian citizenship as the most prominent identity category has increased in importance from 2017 to 2018, while self-identification as an 'ethnic Ukrainian' has dropped off somewhat. This shift suggests that the war has fostered an inclusive civic identity and a stronger notion of the Ukrainian state.

Ukrainian is the language most Ukrainians describe as their native language. Yet, the propensity to say that Ukrainian is one's native language has decreased from one year to the next regardless of age, educational background, religion, and other socio-demographic factors. In turn, by 2018 Ukrainians have developed a somewhat higher propensity to single out Russian as their native language. This trend might reflect a negative reaction among Russophones or residents of Russophone regions against recent legislation that limits the use of Ukrainian in schools and a prominent official state discourse that has elevated the protection of the Ukrainian language to a national security concern. A significant proportion of the respondents in both years indicated that both Ukrainian and Russian are their native languages, without any statistically significant proportional change between the two years.

According to our survey results, a majority of Ukrainians think that the non-government controlled territories should have the same status as before the war, i.e. as part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. While a clear majority of Ukrainians are still opposed to an autonomy status for the non-government

controlled areas, overall support levels have increased from 2017 to 2018. This shift indicates a divide between public opinion and official state policy. The special status issue also highlights that the regional divisions underpinning attitudes cannot be reduced to an east-west divide.

Ukrainians continue to display a diversity of views on the Minsk Agreement and potential additions to the negotiations. Only one of the statements in the survey exhibited a statistically significant change in public opinion from 2017 to 2018: fewer people in 2018 thought that there should be a new international negotiation format including the US. The idea of a UN mission eventually covering the whole territory of the non-government controlled areas, a question only asked in 2018, meets with high approval among the respondents though respondents in Eastern Ukraine are more sceptical than those in Western Ukraine. The overall approval rate underlines the need for Ukrainian, Russian and international actors to step up discussions about this option within the existing negotiation framework.

Most Ukrainians have not lived or worked in the EU or in Russia during the last ten years. Nevertheless, many Ukrainians have ties to the EU and to Russia. The latter persist despite the state of bilateral state relations: around a third of the survey respondents have family and friends in the EU, and around 40 per cent have similar ties to Russia. The likelihood to have family or friends in the EU has increased from 2017 to 2018, while the odds to have personal ties in Russia have not changed significantly. Thus, while the political and economic linkages between Ukraine and Russia have, for the most part, been interrupted, people-to-people ties persist and are a basis from which to rebuild state relations at a later point in time. It is also apparent that the EU has become a more attractive destination for Ukrainian migrants.

The comparison of Ukrainian public opinion over two years demonstrates that views and identities can change within even a short period of time. In particular, in a context of war, it is important to pay close attention to these trends, as they contain clues as to how closely the public at large is aligned with state policy, the role of inclusive or diverse identities in view of more exclusive state policies, and about the space for (uncomfortable) political choices. As the survey results show, public opinion is more nuanced than the official state rhetoric or policy on 'Ukrainianness', the Ukrainian language, and conflict-resolution.

Appendix

Regression models predict the outcome of one variable in the presence of another variable. Additional variables (e.g. age or gender) can be introduced to control for their effects. Significance tests are conducted to rule out that the observed differences occurred by chance due to sampling variability. Statistical significance thus indicates a higher degree of certainty that the observed differences in the data also hold for the overall population.

The data was weighted for gender, six age groups, four macro regions and urban/rural to adjust for socio-demographic differences between the samples and the overall population. For measuring the difference between the 2017 and 2018 samples, a dummy variable was introduced (2017=0, 2018=1).

The variable measuring native language asked respondents what they considered their native language. They could choose between 'Ukrainian', 'Russian', 'both' or 'other'. The category 'Ukrainian' was recoded to 1, and all others were recoded to 0. The same procedure was followed with the answer categories 'Russian' and 'both'. The dummy variables 'Ukrainian citizen' and 'ethnic Ukrainian' were derived from a 10-level identity variable.

The same procedure of dummy coding was applied to a variable containing various different statements on the status of the non-government controlled Donbas. With regard to the Minsk Agreement, respondents were asked how much they agreed with certain statements. The answers to the Minsk-questions drew on a five-level Likert-scale ranging from 'agree' to 'disagree', including a neutral middle category. This neutral category was coded as missing. Then, the categories 'agree' and 'somewhat agree' were collapsed to 1, and the categories 'disagree' and 'somewhat disagree' were collapsed to 0. Gender as well as whether the respondent lived in an urban or rural area were measured with a dummy (female=0, male=1; 0=rural, 1=urban).

For measuring the effect of income, a 9-level income variable from 'Less than 1001 UAH' to 'More than 10000 UAH' was introduced as a continuous variable, as was age (measured in years, starting from age 18). A simplified variable indicating the educational level of the respondent was introduced, reducing an eight-level scale from 'basic (less than 7 grades)' to 'complete higher education' to a dummy variable: the levels 'vocational secondary (technical school etc.)', 'incomplete higher education (3 years and more)' and 'complete higher education' were combined under the value '1', all lower educational levels were coded to 0. The respondents' religious denomination was controlled for in three ways. First, all orthodox respondents were compared in a dummy variable with all others (all others=0; orthodox=1). Second, a dummy variable was introduced comparing Greek Catholics with all others (all other=0; Greek Catholics=1). Third, a factor variable was introduced to compare the different effects for followers of the Kyiv and the Moscow Patriarchate. This variable is a three-level variable with the reference category being the followers of the Kyiv Patriarchate (2=Moscow Patriarchate; 3=all others). Lastly, a factor variable was introduced controlling for the macro region of the respondents; people from Southern, Central and Eastern Ukraine were compared to the reference group 'Western Ukraine'.

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